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A assistência e previdência social brasileira são muito caras em relação ao perfil etário e de renda do país. 
Uma causa disso foi a indexação dos pisos de benefícios ao salário mínimo, feita na Constituição. Outras 
causas  são  a  baixa  idade  de  elegibilidade,  os  valores  relativamente  altos  de  benefícios,  um  período 
mínimo de contribuição relativamente curto, a possibilidade de os beneficiários acumularem mais de um 
tipo de benefício e o caráter assistencialista de alguns benefícios. Em 2050 os brasileiros com 65 anos ou 
mais serão 23% da população total e o número de pessoas em idade ativa estará em queda. 
 






Brazil’s social security and social assistance provisions are too expensive and becoming more so relative 
to  the  country’s  age  profile  and  per  capita  GDP.  One  reason  for  this  is  the  fact  that  in  the1988 
Constitution  social  security  pensions  were  indexed  to  the  minimum  wage.  Other  reasons  are  low 
eligibility age, high pensions relative to past contributions, a short minimum contribution period, the 
possibility of accumulating different benefits and the fact that some social security benefits are dispensed 
as social assistance benefits. In 2050 Brazilians 65 or older will represent 23% of total population, while 
the workforce will be shrinking. Unless comprehensive reform is made in the country’s social provisions, 
they will become unsustainable. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper argues that Brazil’s social provisions must undergo deep regulatory changes if they are to meet 
the challenge posed by the country’s shifting demography. It is argued that population aging is the single 
most important factor affecting social security in Brazil. Unless a comprehensive overhaul of regulation 
concerning  eligibility  conditions  and  the  value  of  benefits  is  made  soon,  social  security’s  cost  may 
become unmanageable. 
 
The following section presents an outline of the demographic transition Brazil is undergoing. After that is 
presented  an  outline  of  Brazil’s  social  security  provisions, as well an explanation of their regulatory 
shortcomings. Finally, the concluding remarks are presented. 
 
 
The graying of Brazil 
 
It  is known that, as life expectancy gets longer, it is necessary to achieve ever greater reductions in 
mortality rates in order to get marginal increases in life expectancy (Olshansky, Carnes e Cassel, 1993). 
Despite suggestions that there is an absolute ceiling to human longevity, old age is potentially a larger 
challenge than population increase (Paiva; Wajnman, 2005). 
 
When a population grows older, disease and disability patterns change markedly. Institutions like social 
security  will not be able to cope without undergoing substantial restructuring, In 1900 less than one 
percent  of  world  population  was  65  or  older.  In  1992  it  was  6.2%.  In  2050  it  will  be  over  20% 
(Olshansky, Carnes e Cassel, 1993). A illustrative case is that of the United States: during the 1980s the 
number of centenarians grew 160%, By 2050 between 20 and 40 million Americans will be 85 or older 
and from 500 thousands to four million will be centenarians (PERLS, 1995). 
 
Throughout its history up to the 1970s, Brazil had a very young population, the result of high mortality, 
high birth rates and low life expectancy. Population growth during the nineteenth century averaged 1.5% 
per year (IBGE 2000b). Immigration from Europe was an important element of population increase from 
the  mid  nineteenth  century  to  the  first  quarter  of  the  twentieth  century
3.  But  from  the  1930s  on, 
immigration comes to a trickle and population growth is almost exclusively from the reproduction of the 
country’s resident population. Average population growth between 1900 and 1940 was 2.2% per year, 
edging up to 2.3% per year in the 1940s. 
 
In the following three decades Brazil experienced even faster population increase, with population growth 
averaging 2.8% per year in the 1950-1980 period. Despite rapid population growth, the country’s age 
distribution barely changed in the first seven decades of the century. Chart 1 shows Brazilian population 
from 1900 to 2050
4. Chart 2 shows Brazil’s demographic pyramids for years 1940, 1990 and 2050. The 
changes in the country’s age structure are easy to see, particularly from 1990 to what is expected to be the 
case in 2050. 
 
In the 1970s population growth started to decelerate, a trend much more noticeable from the 1980s on. As 
a result, the proportion of Brazilians younger than 15, which hovered above 42% of total population from 
1940 to 1970, decreased to 38% in 1980 and to the vicinity of 30% in 2000. This age group started to 
                                                 
3 There was an earlier influx of people to the colony and then Empire of Brazil: that of Africans brought as slaves. After the 
enslavement of indigenous populations and their exposure to European diseases much reduced their numbers, slave trade 
became a crucial feature of the Brazilian economy from the 16
th century until at least the first quarter of the 19
th century. Over 
a third of total slave trade from Africa to the Western Hemisphere was destined to Brazil (IBGE 2000b). Today, half the 
population claims to have at least partial African descent (IBGE 2007b). 
4 . There are no data relative to years 1910 and 1930, and to years 1900 and 1920 there is no disaggregated data by age group. 
The data that refer to the period prior to 1980 are from the censuses. For the period 1980-2050 the data are from the projection 
by IBGE.  
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shrink in absolute terms in the 1990s (see Chart 1) and its weight in the total population is expected to 
steadily decrease throughout the projected period. 
 
It took sixty years for the age group of 65 years or older to increase its participation in the total population 
by  three  percentage  points,  from  2.4%  in  the  1940  Census  to  5.4%  in  the  2000  Census.  But  this 
proportion will treble in just forty years, from 6.8% in 2010 to 22.7% in 2050, an absolute growth of 36 
million. By comparison, the 15-64 years age group is going to grow by 7.5 million in the same period. As 
for the population as a whole, it will grow from 193 million in 2010 to a peak of 220 million in the 2030s 
and then start to decline. In 2050 total population is projected to be around 215 million. 
 
Brazilians comprising the age group of 15-64 years represented around 55% of population from 1940 to 
1970. Then, in the 1980 Census the proportion rose to 58% and is expected to peak at around 70% by the 
2020s. Chart 3 shows that the growth rate of this group is decelerating and will become negative in the 
2020s. Chart 3 also shows the number of people in age group 15-64 relative to a person belonging to age 
group 65 or older. By the 2020s there will be five people of group 15-64 to each person of group 65 or 
older. The proportion today is twelve to one. By 2050 the proportion will be less than three to one. Since 
age group 15-64 comprises the bulk of the workforce, Brazil is right now in a “window of opportunity” to 
accelerate its economic growth and elevate its per capita income, before its demographics turns from an 
asset into a drag to economic growth. 
 
One important way in which the shifting age structure may become a drag on Brazil’s economic growth is 
through  increasing  pensions  liabilities.  Life  expectancy  at  age  65  in  Brazil  resembles  developed 
countries’ (see Chart 4). In 1996 Brazil had over 22 thousand centenarians, 65% them women (Camarano, 
1999). And the number of young workers has already reached a plateau and will start to shrink in a 
decade’s time, as shown in Chart 5. The chart also shows that, whereas the dependency ratio is going to 
fall in the coming years, its composition will change dramatically, indicating a shrinking pool of new 
workers and a growing burden of pensions costs on taxpayers. 
 
There are three main ways to counterbalance this long term trend: immigration, faster productivity growth 
and incentives that encourage people to stay longer in the workforce and draw to it people that potentially 
could be in it. As will be argued in the following paragraphs, neither immigration nor productivity growth 
by themselves seem enough to counterbalance the rise in pensions liabilities. 
 
In theory immigration could stabilize the age distribution and bring much needed skilled workers to the 
labor pool. But designing and implementing an effective immigration policy is difficult and demands long 
term planning and political consensus. It seems that policymakers and indeed Brazilian society have not 
even started to discuss this possibility. Current immigration is pitiful and there is not even a hint of the 
government implementing a policy of attraction of skilled immigrants
5. It is now over eight decades since 
the last period in which the country benefited from a continued and significant influx of immigrants. 
 
There is universal consensus that productivity growth is vital to a country’s prosperity, but recent trends 
are not very encouraging in Brazil’s case. Chart 6 shows real year-on-year GDP growth in Brazil from 
1900 to 2008. The chart also shows 13 years-moving averages of per capita growth from 1900 to 2008, 
and of per capita growth of the 15-64 age group from 1940 to 2008. The use of moving averages was 
meant to smooth out the economic cycle and to emphasize broader trends. Average per capita growth 
from 1900 to 2008 was 2.5% per year. There are no population data disaggregated by age relative to the 
1900 and 1920 Censuses, but if one assumes stability in the age distribution between 1900 and 1940, then 
                                                 
5 According to PNAD, in 2007 there were under 700 thousand foreign-born residents in Brazil, or about 0.36% of total 
population (IBGE 2007e). According to the Labor Ministry, 20,162 work permits were granted to foreigners in 2004. The 
respective numbers in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 were: 24,158, 25,440, 29,488 and 43,993. But the vast majority of these 
permits were temporary ones. Permanent permits were just 1,284 (in 2004), 2,132 (in 2005) 2,055 (in 2006), 2,615 (in 2007) 
and 2,722 (in 2008) (Brasil 2009b).  
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average per capita growth for the 15-64 age group between 1900 and 2008 was 2.4% per year. If one 
accepts that per capita growth in the 15-64 age group is a proxy of workforce productivity growth, it is 
clear that the country has not yet recovered the dynamism prior to the 1980s. 
 
Of course one cannot assume that Brazil will not be able of obtaining faster productivity growth in the 
future. But a shrinking labor pool means that the country will have to rely more on productivity growth 
than on new entrants in the labor market than ever before. To achieve this will probably be impossible 
without  much  better  public  education  and  without  offering  the  incentives  and  means  for  continuous 
education of mature workers. The authors see scant signs of such policies being developed today. 
 
 
The 1988 Constitution and the Plano Real 
 
Brazil adopted a new Constitution in 1988 that set numerous social obligations to the State. It was agreed 
that social security would have a minimum value of benefit, equal to the value of the minimum wage. 
Thus, in effect social security was indexed to the minimum wage and from then on minimum wage policy 
would influence social security policy. 
 
Another feature of the 1980s was hyperinflation. Accumulated inflation from January 1980 to December 
1987 was 189,209.82% averaging 156.83% per year or 8.18% per month. In 1988, the year the new 
Constitution was adopted, inflation was 980.21% for the year. It is equivalent to 21.93% per month. From 
January  1988  to  June  1994  (when  the  Real  Plan  was  adopted)  accumulated  inflation  was 
5,944,242,723.43%, averaging 25.80% a month. In contrast, accumulated inflation in the period from July 
1994 to February 2009 was 240.93%, averaging 0.70% a month. Chart 7 shows the real value of the 
minimum wage from January 1989 to March 2009. A noticeable feature is the wide swings the real value 
of the minimum wage was subjected to between January 1989 and June 1994. 
 
Before the stabilization plan, even monthly big nominal raises of the minimum wage failed to elevate its 
real  purchasing  power  over  long  periods.  In  contrast,  in  the  new  macroeconomic  environment  even 
modest yearly nominal readjustments of the minimum wage were enough to guarantee that its real value 
would more than double between 1994 and 2009. It is possible to see in Chart 7 the appreciation of the 
minimum wage between July 1994 and March 2009. Its real value appreciated 111.7% in the period, 
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Chart 1- Brazilian population – 1900-2050 
Source: IBGE 1940 and 2008b. 



























































































































































































Source: IBGE 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 2000b and 2008b. 
Source: United Nations 2008. 
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Source: IBGE 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970 and 2008b. 
 
Note: Dependency ratio is defined as population under age 15 plus 
population 65 years and older, expressed as percentage of population in the 
15-64 age group. Aging ratio is defined as population in age group 65 years 
or older as a percentage of population under age 15. 
Chart 5- Dependency ratio and aging ratio (left side scale), and 
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Gráfico 6 – Brazil’s GDP variation – 1900-2008 
Sources: IPEADATA 2009e . 
                 IBGE 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970 e 2008b.  
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Outline of social security 
 
Since the 1990s social assistance cash transfer, means-tested programs were created aimed at poverty 
alleviation. The country has made important strides for the last twenty years or so in improving its social 
indicators and in expanding social insurance and social assistance coverage
6. But the flip side of much 
expanded  social  provisions  is  an  ever-increasing  tax  burden
7.  In  the  wake  of  the  stabilization  plan 
economic growth steadied, with average GDP growth of 3.3% per year in the 1993-2008 period. It is still 
low if compared to the 1900-1980 period, but is an improvement on the situation of the 1980s and early 
1990s (GDP growth averaged 1.4% per year between 1981 and 1992). Today’s Brazil bears a population 
nearing 195 million, has a diversified industrial base and a US$2.1 trillion GDP, based on purchasing-
power-parity (IMF 2009). 
 
On one side of Brazil’s social security system, the Regime Geral da Previdência Social (RGPS) broadly 
insures private sector workers and comprises the vast majority of insured workers and their beneficiaries
8. 
On  the  other  side,  the  Regimes  Particulares  de  Previdência  Social  (RPPS)  insure  public  sector 
employees. This division is not so stark, as some public employees are insured by the RGPS
9. 
 
A feature of the RPPS is their fragmentation. There is a RPPS for federal public employees, each state has 
its  own  RPPS  and  even some  municipalities  have  their  RPPS.  There  are  also special social security 
provisions for the military. On a per capita basis RPPS pensioners are costlier than RGPS pensioners. But 
on the aggregated level the decisive factor determining the cost of social security is the growth trajectory 
of the RGPS costs, due to a much bigger insured population. 
 
Workers insured by RGPS are entitled to old-age pension (this benefit has two sets of rules regarding 
eligibility conditions, as will be seen later), “special” retirement pension (to workers in jobs deemed to be 
particularly unhealthy), disability pension and survivors pension. There are also other benefits to insured 
workers  and  their  families:  monthly  payments  for  sickness  and  maternity,  work  injury,  temporary 
disability (due to disease or accident), family allowances benefits (income-tested) and monthly payments 
to the insured’s dependents in case he or she goes to prison. 
 
There are other public services and programs that can be considered as integrating the framework of a 
welfare state. One such program is unemployment benefit. Workers formally registered are entitled to 
unemployment benefit. Another provision is public health care. Any Brazilian is entitled to use a public, 
country-wide,  health  system  that  provides,  free  of  charges,  dental  care,  medical  consultation, 
hospitalization and some types of medicines. 
 
There is a number of social assistance programs maintained by the federal government. Many states and 
municipalities run social assistance and public health programs of their own too. There is one federal 
                                                 
6 For instance, the percentage of children in the age group 7-14 years attending school grew from 79.4% in 1991 (IPEADATA 
2009c) to 96.6% in 2007 (IPEADATA 2009b) and the Gini coefficient fell from 0.636 in 1989 to 0.556 in 2007 (IPEADATA 
2009f). Life expectancy at birth rose from 67.0 years in 1991 to 72.7 in 2007 and infant mortality fell from 45.1‰ in 1991 to 
25.8‰ in 2005 (IBGE 2000a and 2007a). 
7 Total tax burden increased from 24.4% of GDP in 1991 to 30.4% of GDP in 2000, to 34.1% of GDP in 2006 (IPEADATA 
2009a). This trend cannot be solely attributed to social provisions funding. But social security and social assistance are a big 
and increasing part of it. For instance, total tax burden grew by 3.7% of GDP from 2000 to 2006. Social security and social 
assistance cost grew by 3.5% of GDP in the same period (see Chart 4). 
8 The economically active population in 2007 was around 100 million. The number of public employees was less than 5% of 
this total. Though the number of insured workers is between 50% and 60% of the workforce, virtually all non-public 
employees are insured or potentially insurable by RGPS (IBGE 2007d). 
9 For example, some state-owned companies like Banco do Brasil. Also, many municipalities across the country have their 
employees insured by the RGPS. It is also possible for a town or state to cease its RPPS and make their public employees 
insured by the RGPS. In fact, in 2007 there were 3,378 municipalities in which public employees were insured by RGPS and 
1,937 municipalities with RPPS, of which 275 were in process of migrating to RGPS (Brasil 2009d).  
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social assistance program of monthly installments to needy elderly or disabled persons, the Benefício de 
Prestação Continuada (BPC), that is of interest to the arguments advanced in this paper because, as will 
be argued later, it influences some workers’ decision of whether to contribute or not to RGPS. BPC exists 
alongside other social assistance programs that will not be commented here
10. 
 
The country’s social security and welfare provisions are comprehensive and a strong argument can be 
made  in  their  favor.  They  play  an  important  role  in  decreasing  inequality  and  poverty  levels  and  in 
promoting social stability. Arguably, a case can be made for their importance in helping to smooth out the 
economic cycle, since they constitute a steady income, not derived from work or capital gains and so help 
to steady demand. 
 
But an even stronger argument can be made in criticizing the focus and cost of these provisions. In 
particular, the existing social security regulation exacerbates the impact of the demographic changes the 
country is experiencing, because of three regulatory shortcomings: low elegibility age, the use of social 
insurance to promote welfare policy and the high value of benefits relative to past contributions. 
 
 
Regulatory problems: the eligibility age 
 
One flaws is that the minimum eligibility age to retirement is too low. A male urban worker may become 
eligible  to  old-age  pension  as  young  as  53,  if he started contributing at age 18, and a female urban 
workers is entitled to the same benefit at age 48, again, if she started contributing at age 18. And if the 
worker is an elementary school or high school teacher, retirement age can be five years lower, because 
required contribution time is five years lower than for other workers. 
 
Since old-age retirement benefit is intended to be an insurance against the loss of work capacity due to 
old age, it is easy to see how out-of-touch the current eligibility requirements are. As seen in Chart 4, 
elderly Brazilians’ life expectancy comes near the observed in high-income countries. It means many 
pensioners have a good chance of receiving retirement benefit for a longer period than their number of 
years of contribution. 
 
For this type of old-age retirement benefit, the average value of benefit is higher than for other pensions
11. 
It is reasonable to assume that, since workers eligible to this benefit draw higher pensions because they 
were able to earn higher wages, they are more productive than average. Thus, the low age of retirement 
simultaneously deprives the work pool of some of its more productive members and adds relatively young 
pensioners to the swelling number of beneficiaries. 
 
There is a measure implemented in 1999 that imposes a penalty on the younger claimants of old-age 
pension, lowering the value of the benefit according to a formula that takes in consideration their life 






                                                 
10 Information relative to eligibility conditions and social provisions can be accessed in the websites of various Ministries. For 
RGPS, RPPS and BPC, see Ministério da Previdência Social (http://www.previdencia.gov.br/). For information concerning 
federal social assistance programs see Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (http://www.mds.gov.br/). 
For information on social insurance see Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego (http://www.mte.gov.br/). For information on 
health services see Ministério da Saúde (http://portal.saude.gov.br/saude/). 
11 In February 2009 the average pension for this set of eligibility rules was R$1,133.15. For old-age pensions granted according 
to the other set of eligibility conditions the average value was R$483.93. (Brasil 2009e).  
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Where: 
pension: old-age retirement pension benefit. 
w: average of the 80% highest wages for which the insured paid contribution, corrected for inflation. 
f : fator previdenciário. 
t: contribution period (in years). 
x e : life expectation at age x (the age in which the insured will start receiving the benefit). 
x: age in which the insured will start receiving the pension. 
0.31: is the total rate of contribution, adding the rates paid by the insured (11% of gross salary) and 
by the employer (20% of payroll). 
 
The technical details won’t be commented here. It suffices to point out that the value of benefit will 
decrease with longer life expectancy and increase with longer contribution time and with higher age of 
retirement. So, it is a way of encouraging workers who reach eligibility age to stay longer active and 
contributing.  Although  helpful,  it  has  limitations.  For  one  thing,  if  the  worker  earns  just  above  the 
minimum  wage,  he  or  she  may  end  earning  almost  what  would  be  the  case  without  the  fator 
previdenciário, because the minimum wage is a floor to the value of pensions. Also, the pensioner can 
stay working after retirement. Finally, a reform of social security sufficient to keep it viable in the long 
run probably would set a higher eligibility age than the average age people choose to retire even when 
considering the fator previdenciário. 
 
Some beneficiaries stay in the workforce, since one doesn’t have to renounce his or her retirement benefit 
in order to work. In 2007, 36.5% of male pensioners and 26.0% of female pensioners were economically 
active (IBGE 2007c). It ameliorates the shortage of skilled workers. But, as the contribution rates are high 
and the worker already receives a benefit, there is a strong incentive to collusion between employer and 
the retired employee to avoid paying contribution, by concealing from the government part or all of the 
wages paid. In the case of self-employed workers it is probably easier. Even when no such schemes are 
implemented, it seems poor use of taxpayer’s money to grant to an able and willing worker a benefit 
conceived as an insurance against the loss of capacity to work due to old age. 
 
Women can retire five years younger and with a contribution period five years shorter than men’s. But 
there is no objective reason for women to retire five years younger than men. A hypothesis for this is 
there  is  a  disposition  of  the  policymakers  to  “compensate”  and  to  “make  up”  for  the hardships and 
discrimination women suffer, and for the “double shift” they endure as workers and housewives. The 
problem with this reasoning is that old-age retirement was conceived as an insurance against loss of 
capacity  for  work  due  to  old  age,  and  should  not  be  used  as  an  instrument  to  correct  gender-based 
discrimination. 
 
Many people suffer hardships due to their ethnic backgrounds, sexual orientation, physical appearance or 
a psychological trauma for being raised in a dysfunctional family. To suggest that retirement eligibility 
age should be lowered to them because of these hardships seems at least as logical as suggesting it should 
be lowered due to gender. Besides, not all women suffer the same hardships or with the same intensity. A 
given female worker may be single, and therefore she doesn’t have to cope with any “double shift”, or she 
may be a very talented professional not discriminated against because of gender. Or she may live in a 
household with servants. A woman in these favorable situations is entitled to retire at the same age of 
women who face all kinds of hardships, including the ones stated at the beginning of this paragraph. 
 
Paradoxically, as a consequence of the existing regulation, increasing female participation in the labor 
market (a possible way of attenuating the effects of the demographic transition) deepens social security’s 
liabilities. Because they have shorter contribution period, retire younger and have longer life expectancy  
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than men (see Chart 4), the bigger the proportion of women in the labor market, the lower will be the 
average age of retirement, the shorter the average period of contribution, and the longer will be the 
average period pensioners will draw benefits. 
 
As  for  rural  workers,  they  can  retire  five  years  younger  than  urban  workers  and,  again,  there  is  no 
objective reason for that. The relative insalubrious work conditions or shorter life expectancy that would 
justify a lower eligibility age are supposed as a consequence of the fact that a person is a rural worker. Of 
course it is hard to toil in the fields, but many urban jobs are also arduous activities that don’t grant 
people  engaging  in  them  the  privilege  of  early  retirement.  Eligibility  rules  for  rural  workers  have 
characteristics resembling more social assistance than social security. For instance, under the present rules 
people who in essence just raise chickens and grow food for their own household may be considered 
eligible for retirement, provided that the household is located in a rural area. 
 
Low eligibility age makes the system more expensive to fund. If eligibility age is set too low, many 
people still fit to work will retire. This simultaneously increases the aggregated cost of social security and 
shrinks  the  pool  of  contributions.  If,  as  it  is  the  case  in  Brazil,  demographic  changes  increase  the 
proportion  of  people  reaching  eligibility  age  relative  to  younger  workers,  social  security  costs  may 
become unbearable. But the low eligibility age is intertwined with other regulatory problems, as the fact 
that social security is used as social assistance. 
 
 
Regulatory problems: social security as social assistance 
 
The second flaw is that some social security benefits are in practice social assistance benefits. Many of 
the active RGPS benefits don’t keep any proportionality to past contributions. One reason is that, due to a 
constitutional provision, the lowest value for any retirement or survivors benefit is the minimum wage. 
Since over two thirds of Brazilian workers earn less than the equivalent of two times the minimum wage 
per month, in practice they retire with near full or full earnings. Chart 8 shows the income of all people of 
ten or more years of age who have income, from 2001 to 2007. The chart shows a series for rural workers 
and another for urban workers. 
 
Old-age pensions are at least 70% of the wage, and this only in the case the claimant did not completed 
the full period of contribution. If eligibility conditions are fully met, the benefit will be equivalent to the 
average of the 80% highest wages the claimant earned (after correcting for inflation), up to the maximum 
value of benefit. 
 
As aforementioned, there is another set of eligibility rules for old-age pension. In this second set urban 
male  workers  must  be  65  years  old  (60  for  women),  but  have  to  accumulate  only  180  monthly 
contributions. Since no benefit can pay less than the minimum wage, and in order to guarantee a pension 
equivalent to it is not necessary to pay contribution relative to earnings in excess of the minimum wage, 
there are strong incentives to cheat. 
 
Suppose that a 30 years old, low-skilled urban male worker thinks it is improbable his future monthly 
earnings will increase much above the minimum wage. As his pension will be at least the minimum wage, 
it is rational (though dishonest) to avoid paying contribution relative to any earnings that exceed the 
minimum wage. In fact, if he thinks that he will not be able to accumulate 35 years of contribution before 
he is 65, he may even opt to avoid paying any contribution apart the minimum number of 180. 
 
Rural workers are exempt from contribution. They are entitled to a monthly old age benefit equivalent to 
the minimum wage from age 60 (if male) or 55 (if female). It is required proof of past work in the rural 
sector for a total period of at least 180 months and to be working as a rural worker by the time the benefit 
is claimed. It is easy to cheat, for in many cases it is virtually impossible to verify whether the claimant  
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really worked as a rural worker for the required period or just used to live in a dwelling located in a rural 
area.  Though  formally  a  social  security  benefit,  old-age  pension  to  rural  workers  is  really  a  social 
assistance program. 
 
Survivors benefit is another instance of imbalance between contribution and benefit. Survivors benefit is 
equivalent  to  the  full  value  of  the  retirement  pension  paid  or  payable  to  the  deceased  and  can  be 
accumulated with retirement benefit. For example, in the case of a couple in which both spouses are 
retired, in the event of the passing of one of them, the survivor is eligible to survivors benefit
12. There are 
two inconsistencies here. One is that the per capita income of the dependents actually rises with the 
passing  of  the  retired  person.  The  other  is  that  the  benefit  was  intended  to  support  the  deceased’s 




Regulatory problems: the value of the benefits 
 
The third flaw is that the starting value of the benefit granted is a high proportion of past wages and its 
real value increases with time. This is due to indexation of benefits to the minimum wage and the fact that 
successive  Brazilian  governments  have  pursued  a  policy  of  conceding  above-inflation  raises  to  the 
minimum wage (see Chart 7). The consequence of this policy is that the aggregate cost of social security 
growths due to the increase in the number of beneficiaries, but also because the real average value of the 
ongoing benefits increases each time the minimum wage is raised. 
 
With each raise social security costs grow in tandem. It means that, instead of a policy of maintaining 
purchasing power of benefits, successive governments have in fact pursued a policy of increasing the real 
value of ongoing benefits. It compounds the problem of financing the pensions of a swelling number of 
beneficiaries. Alas, embroiling minimum wage policy and pensions have other undesirable effects. 
 
The wages are concentrated around the value of the minimum wage and this concentration has been 
increasing (see Chart 8). It means that the aforementioned incentives to conceal earnings in excess of the 
minimum wage are also becoming stronger. One would deduce that at least the pensioners would be 
happy to see their real purchasing power periodically elevated. But this is not so, due to an impromptu 
measure that has been used to attenuate the impact of the minimum wage policy on social security costs, 
as explained below. 
 
Though there is a constitutional provision indexing the minimum value of benefit to the minimum wage, 
the readjustment of higher benefits is at officials’ discretion. So, in an attempt to abate the full impact of a 
minimum wage raise on the costs of social security, higher benefits are readjusted by less than that raise. 
Pensions have their real value increased, but the higher ones by a lesser amount. As a result the weighted 
readjustment  rate  of  total  pensions  obligations  is  smaller  than  the  rate  set  to  the  minimum  wage. 
Unfortunately, this artifice is both of diminishing effect and a cause of frustration to pensioners who 
retired receiving higher pensions. 
 
It  is  of  diminishing  effect  because,  as  the  real  value  of  the  minimum  wage  increases  faster  than 
productivity growth, the salaries of workers earning more than the minimum wage tend to be readjusted 
for less than the raise given to it. As can be seen in Chart 8, the ensuing effect is a bigger proportion of 
the work force earning low multiples of the minimum wage. Therefore, a bigger proportion of claimants 
will start receiving pensions equal or just a bit above the minimum wage. Also, unequal raises to ongoing 
                                                 
12 The number of people receiving just old age pension or just survivors pension grew by 17.8% between 2001 and 2007 (from 
17.4 million to 20.6 million). The number of people accumulating old age and survivors pension grew by 57.1% in the same 
period, from 1.0 million to 1.6 million (IBGE 2001 and 2007c).  
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pension benefits approximate the value of older benefits to the minimum wage. The average rate of 
readjustment for the aggregate pensions is thus increasing towards the rate of the minimum wage. 
 
Being the minimum wage such an important institutional price, Brazilians are used to measure wages and 
pensions as multiples of it. Though their purchasing power has been increasing, pensioners with higher 
pensions realize that, as time goes by, their pension is decreasing as a multiple of it. 
 
In practice, the pensioners with higher benefits are being discriminated against. This is the result of 
haphazard attempts to rein in the growing cost of pensions. Of course the real problem is the fact that 
social security policy shouldn’t be in tow of minimum wage policy. As mentioned, this practice has 
decreasing effectiveness. Over time, it has led to the lowering of the maximum benefit, expressed as a 
multiple of the minimum wage (see Chart 7). The result is that a growing proportion of pensioners receive 
raises proportionally equal or close to the raise given to the minimum benefit. 
 
One unintended consequence of indexing pensions to the minimum wage is that, as the cost of social 
security soars, the minimum wage policy is being increasingly influenced by concerns about the widening 
gap between social security’s obligations and revenues. That is, minimum wage policy is increasingly in 
tow of social security policy. 
 
Even though Brazil’s social security contribution rates are equivalent to around a third of gross salary (see 
Equation [1]), it has been necessary to apportion a growing share of total tax revenues to meet social 
security’s  obligations.  This  tendency  has  somewhat  abated  in  recent  years,  as  economic  growth 
accelerated due to a commodity-led export boom, increasing employment and contributions to RGPS. 
But, despite the favorable recent conjuncture, it seems probable that population aging will widen the gap 
between social security’s revenues and obligations for years to come. 
 
 
The Benefício de Prestação Continuada 
 
As noted before, BPC is a social assistance benefit that is of importance to social security. It is meant to 
alleviate urban old-age population’s poverty (as seen before, the old-age rural population is assisted by a 
form  of  retirement  benefit  that  is,  in  essence,  a  social  assistance  benefit  akin  to  BPC,  with  lower 
eligibility age). It is equivalent to the minimum wage and indexed to it. There is no need to have ever 
contributed or to have had a formal job. To be eligible to BPC it is necessary to be at least 65 years old 
and to live in a household where per capita income is at or under 25% of the minimum wage. 
 
It means that poverty is defined as a fraction of the minimum wage. And, as the minimum wage has 
consistently being raised above inflation for fifteen years now, more people become eligible to BPC. A 
person with income a little above the poverty line in a given year may be deemed “poor” in the next, even 
if his or her purchasing power remained the same, just because the minimum wage was raised above the 
inflation rate relative to the period. 
 
The obvious critic is that fighting poverty should not be in tow of minimum wage policy. As prices vary 
across the country, one-size-fits-all poverty alleviation measures lack effectiveness and waste resources. 
In metropolitan areas, where the cost of living is relatively high and many poor people live in slums far 
from downtown and lacking public services, it may well be that a benefit equivalent to the minimum 
wage is not enough to a poor household’s needs. In contrast, in many small towns the cost of living is 
lower and it is not uncommon that many urbanites grow edible plants and breed chicken for meat and 
eggs in their backyards. There, householders with a per capita income below the official poverty line 







































Source for minimum wage: IPEADATA 2009g. 
Source for maximum benefit: Brasil 2005 and 2009c. 
Note: Minimum wage refers to the left-side scale and maximum benefit to the right-side 








































































































































































































Chart 7- Real value of the minimum wage and maximum social security 







2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Urban - More than 2
Urban - More than 1 and less or equal to 2
Urban - Less or equal to 1
Rural - More than 2
Rural - More than 1 and less or equal to 2



















































































Source: IBGE 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007c. 
Chart 8- Population aged 10 years old or more, according to income (as multiples of 
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Source for cost: Brasil 2009a. 
Source for benefits: Brasil 2009e. 
Source for value of GDP: IPEADATA 2009d. 
Chart 9- Cost of social insurance and social assistance as a 
percentage of GDP (left side scale) and millions of current 
benefits in December (right side scale) – 2000/2007  
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The fact that BPC is indexed to the minimum age entangles it to social security. It was previously argued 
that there is an incentive to cheat in the case of an insured person who earns just above the minimum 
wage. If this person lives in a household where per capita income is near the poverty line, he or she might 
be tempted not to contribute at all, since BPC and the minimum social security pension are worth the 
same. It is relatively easy to omit other householders’ income, since many poor people have no formal 
jobs and it is hard to access their average monthly income. 
 
 
The cost of the social security and social assistance 
 
Social security numbers are shown in Chart 9. Disaggregated figures are not available between 2000 and 
2003  in  the  national  budget.  From  2004  on,  social  security  is  shown  disaggregated  into  RGPS  (all 
benefits) and RPPS (benefits and other functions, like pensions to retired military personnel). Social 
assistance  is  shown  disaggregated  into  BPC  (only  the  benefits  to  old-age  beneficiaries)  and  other 
programs (including BPC to impaired beneficiaries). The chart also shows the number of RGPS benefits 
to  all  forms  of  retirement  pensions,  survivors  pensions  and  BPC  (only  the  number  of  old-age 
beneficiaries). 
 
Average yearly GDP growth was 3.5% between 2000 and 2007. In the same period the cost of social 
security increased by almost three percentage points, from 7.9% of GDP in 2000 to 10.7% in 2007. If 
social security and social assistance are taken together, the increase is over three and a half points, from 
8.3% of GDP in 2000 to 11.9% in 2007. It is remarkable that in such a favorable conjuncture as the one of 
the last five years social assistance still increased as a percentage of GDP. 
 
If Brazil’s age structure could somehow be stabilized as it is now, and even supposing that the existent 
programs are well run there still would be many features of social security and social assistance that 
should be reformed. The present regulation makes social provisions too costly, at 12% of GDP in 2007. In 
order to finance them in their present form, RGPS imposes on firms a contribution rate equivalent to 20% 
of  payroll.  Additionally,  employees  must  pay  a  contribution  rate  from  8%  to  11%  of  gross  salary. 





In two decades Brazil has built a comprehensive welfare state, which services Brazilians have rapidly 
grown accustomed to. But it is a very costly structure and, in the particular case of social security, the 
regulatory framework makes it ill prepared to face the aging of the Brazilian population. 
 
When discussing social security and social assistance one must bear in mind that these programs already 
cost the equivalent of 12% of GDP. Eligibility conditions are such that, even though less than 7% of the 
population is 65 or older, and despite an expansion of 38% of GDP in the last eight years, the cost of 
these programs has still risen as a percentage of GDP. For the foreseeable future the number of pensioners 
will continue to rise relentlessly. Still more worrying, Brazil’s demographic profile is set to resemble 
today’s Italy’s in barely forty years, when about a quarter of total population will be 65 years or older. 
 
As the combination of shrinking workforce and swelling old-age population would impose a strain on any 
social security system, one would expect frantic activity from the policymakers toward reforming social 
security in ways that minimize the impact of these coming developments. It is disputable whether that is 
the case in Brazil. No doubt proposing regulatory changes that curb access to pensions and limit their rise 
is a very hard sell. Basically, the Brazilian people must be told to expect a combination of more years of 
contribution, higher minimum eligibility age, higher contribution rates and lower pensions. The only  
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selling point would be that, in the absence of comprehensive reform, it is difficult to imagine how the 
country will be able to sustain its numerous social provisions in face of an aging population. 
 
The authors think that reforming Brazil’s social provisions should be given high priority in the political 
agenda, for the longer a reform is postponed, the greater the need of one, and more drastic it will have to 
be. For example, it is necessary many years before the full effect of an increased eligibility age or longer 
contribution period is felt. This is so due to the long transition period necessary to new rules to be totally 
effective.  A  long  transition  period  is  vital  to  minimize  political  opposition.  It  means  that  along  the 
transition period the cost of social security relative to GDP may continue to rise for a number of years 
before the stabilizing effects of a reform be felt on costs. 
 
Increasing eligibility age seems an unavoidable measure, though it has the potential to raise significant 
opposition. But this one single measure by itself almost certainly will not be enough to contain the costs 
of social security. Other features must as well be addressed, like lower eligibility age for women relative 
to men and for rural workers relative to urban male workers, the indexation of pensions and BPC to the 
minimum wage, the possibility of accumulating old-age and survivors benefits, shorter contribution time 
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